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The Eye of a Needle: Temporary Prison Leave in Ukraine 
A. Symkovych 
Abstract 
Although temporary prison leave humanises custodial punishment, offsets its negative effects, 
and prepares prisoners for (re)integration into wider society, its use proves to be controversial 
and uneven across jurisdictions. Since the collapse of the USSR, the former Soviet countries 
have been pursuing different criminal justice policies, liberalising some penal practices whilst 
retaining many punitive Soviet legacies. Through analysis of the legal provisions regulating 
temporary prison leave and official statistics in Ukraine, I demonstrate the apparent strain 
between the official policies and practice. Whilst legally available, temporary leave for people in 
closed prisons is almost never granted in this Eastern European country. I argue that for Ukraine 
to reconcile the official rhetoric of rehabilitation and social reintegration of offenders and actual 
implementation of penal policies, the country must reverse the underlying requirements 
governing temporary prison leave and expand its use.  
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Introduction 
Since restoring its independence in 1991, Ukraine has been on the path of democratisation. 
Embarking on the ‘Europeanisation’ project has meant that the country attempts to adopt, 
emulate, and follow the policies and practices established in the European Union (Ladrech, 
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1994).1 To break with its Gulag past, and in order to receive financial, technical, and political 
support from the ‘West’, Ukraine has acceded to the Council of Europe and all major human 
rights instruments. It has abolished the death penalty, outlawed torture, recognised the caselaw of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a part of its national legislation, and opened its 
custodial institutions to inspections by national and supranational human rights monitoring 
bodies (see Symkovych, 2018c). The country has liberalised its penal policies, decriminalising 
some offences, reducing sentences or allowing non-custodial punishment for others, and 
expanding prisoner rights and entitlements. These reforms not only unloaded its cramped 
prisons, but also lent some legitimacy to the political regime – for policy transfers ‘from Europe’ 
are presented in Ukraine, often uncritically, as modern and progressive (Canton, 2006).2 
 
As in some European countries where the number of prisoners has recently decreased (Dünkel, 
2017), Ukraine has reduced its prison population threefold over the last 20 years, from 208,000 
to 56,000. Since 2000, its population rate went from 443 to 157 prisoners per 100,000 
population3 — compared with Poland’s 194 and Russia’s 402 in 2018 (Institute for Crime and 
Justice Policy Research, 2019). Furthermore, many prisoners are now released before serving 
their entire sentences: 15.3% of all released in 2017 were released early on parole (Prison Portal 
of Donetsk Memorial, 2018). Notwithstanding these major changes, many vestiges of repressive 
Soviet penal policies and prison practices persist or even return (see Foglesong & Solomon, 
2001; Piacentini & Slade, 2015; Solomon & Gadowska, 2018; Symkovych, 2018a). Legal 
safeguards for prisoners and their entitlements do not always translate into practice. The regular 
                                                             
1 See Canton (2006) for an example of such policy and practice transfers. 
2 Even so, some policies and attitudes that are seen as being coerced onto Ukraine are resisted for ‘being against 
(allegedly uniform and static) Ukrainian values’ (see Symkovych, 2017, 2019).   
3 Ukraine’s general population also decreased dramatically due to increased mortality and immigration following the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991, as well as the annexation of a part of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2014. 
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reports of the UN’s Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT) and the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) continuously highlight 
unnecessary restrictive penal policies in addition to many serious problems that plague Ukrainian 
prisons. Ukrainian prisoners often live in dilapidated accommodation, do not have access to 
adequate medical testing and treatment; reports of abuse are not unusual, and, like in the Soviet 
times, the prisoner underworld still plays an important role in keeping order in Ukraine’s 
understaffed prisons (CPT, 2015, 2017, 2018; SPT, 2014, 2017; blinded for peer review). 
Security categorisation in Ukraine is devoid of individual risk assessment. The nature of the 
crime, rather than escape risk or control problems, determine the security level of a prison to 
which an offender is assigned and where he or she normally serves the entire sentence. 
 
Despite the major transformations in the post-Soviet countries following the collapse of the 
USSR, we know little about the interplay of penal policies and practices in this part of the world 
(although see Slade, 2016; Symkovych, 2018d, 2018e, 2018c). Through the analysis of the legal 
provisions regulating temporary prison leave and official statistics in Ukraine, my objective is to 
highlight the apparent disjuncture between the official policies and practice. By temporary prison 
leave (henceforth temporary leave) I mean a brief release of prisoners during their custodial 
sentence in closed prisons. I demonstrate that while legally available, temporary leave is almost 
never granted in this Eastern European country.  
 
I begin by highlighting the empirical evidence of the benefits of temporary leave whilst 
acknowledging the attendant risks. I then present the national policies governing temporary leave 
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in Ukraine. These policies are public and accessible via the unified Internet portal of the 
Ukrainian legislature.4 I go on to discuss national statistics on temporary leave in order to 
highlight the discrepancy between the official discourse and policy in action. I conclude by 
arguing that Ukraine must reverse the underlying requirements governing temporary leave and 
expand its use if it is to reconcile the official rhetoric of rehabilitation and social reintegration of 
offenders and actual implementation of penal policies. 
 
What is temporary prison leave about? 
Many countries systematise some form of temporary leave either on humanitarian 
(compassionate) grounds or as part of offender (re)habilitation and preparation for ultimate 
release. The former is usually to allow prisoners to attend (escorted or without direct 
supervision) gravely ill close relatives or their funerals (see European Prison Rules, 2006: Rule 
24.7). The latter is in line with the progressive model of incarceration that Alexander 
Maconochie once championed in Norfolk penal colony (Australia) in the 1840s. According to 
this model, prison serves not only to punish and incapacitate offenders, but also to ‘rehabilitate’ 
them, i.e. to change people so they can lead law-abiding lives upon ultimate release (see Grupp, 
1970; Mandela Rules, 2015: Rules 4 and 87; van Zyl Smit, 1988). Thus, as prisoners start 
demonstrating signs of being ‘rehabilitated’ (‘corrected’), they receive more incentives and 
rights, ultimately progressing towards release (Barry, 1958). In fact, in some countries temporary 
leave constitutes testing of prisoner readiness for parole (Larrauri, 2019; Toch, 1967). 
Temporary leave also serves to humanise sentences and offset the adverse effects of 
incarceration, not least what Goffman (1961) terms mortification, i.e. destruction of prisoner’s 
personhood (see Cheliotis, 2008; European Parliament, 1999; Fox, 1971; Markley, 1973; Shichor 
                                                             
4 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws. 
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& Allen, 1978). It breaks monotony of incarceration and reignites hope that is central to survival 
of imprisonment (Toch, 1967). As a result, the ECtHR declares that temporary leave can in effect 
constitute a civil right even when the national law explicitly frames it as a privilege to be earned 
and granted (Boulois v. Luxembourg, 2012). 
 
Usually, the authorities grant temporary leave for prisoners to engage in a range of ‘purposeful’ 
activities outside prison (rarely, if ever, in lieu of a holiday), whereby prisoners must return to 
custody in the evening or after several days. Among the most common grounds for temporary 
release from custody are family visits, work, education, medical, including substance abuse, 
treatment, as well as arrangement of housing, employment, and other matters important for 
ultimate release (Cheliotis, 2009; Shichor & Allen, 1978; Toch, 1967; Turner & Petersilia, 
1996). The power to grant temporary leave depends on the jurisdiction and is usually vested in 
prison authorities or judges (Cheliotis, 2009; Larrauri, 2019). Whereas in some countries 
temporary leave constitutes a logical step in sentence progression and thus operates in a semi-
automatic fashion once the required conditions are satisfied, in others it involves concerted 
decision-making and (inevitably flawed) risk assessment (see Shammas, 2014; Turner, 2011). In 
the case of discretionary judgement, those in charge seem to prefer to err on the side of lower 
risk, granting temporary leave to the prisoners who have ‘proved’ their trustworthiness by 
behaving well in prison and complying with licence conditions during previous temporary leaves 
(Cheliotis, 2005; Knox & Humphrey, 1981; Moran & Keinänen, 2012; Toch, 1967). This 
tendency to play safe by denying a great many prisoners temporary leave has prompted the 
ECtHR to rule that rejection of prison leave should be convincingly necessary and persuasively 
justifiable (e.g. Płoski v. Poland, 2003).   
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Despite reluctance of the authorities to grant temporary leave, research highlights its role in 
prisoner (re)establishment in society-at-large in general, and desistance from crime in particular 
(Cheliotis, 2008, 2009; LeClair, 1978; LeClair & Guarino-Ghezzi, 1991). In fact, some 
commentators argue that being released without making prior arrangements and adaptation may 
contribute to recidivism (Wright & Rosky, 2011; blinded for peer review). A number of studies 
have found that prison leave correlates with both lower unemployment upon release and less 
frequent return to custody (Cheliotis, 2008; Helmus & Ternes, 2017). Other studies, however, 
question some of the taken-for-granted assumptions regarding the benefits of temporary leave as 
they do not find support for the claim that temporary leave inevitably decreases recidivism 
(Turner & Petersilia, 1996; Waldo & Chiricos, 1977). Furthermore, those studies that 
demonstrate the positive effect of temporary leave do not always fully acknowledge the selection 
bias, including prisoner self-selection, given how risk-averse and conservative the decision-
makers are in authorising temporary leave (although see Cheliotis, 2005, 2008; Markley, 1973; 
Shichor & Allen, 1978). Nonetheless, prison leave still allows prisoners to counterbalance the 
Goffmanian mortification, as well as preserve or develop family ties and other social contacts on 
the outside that prison tends to sever (see European Prison Rules, 2006: Rules 24.4 and 24.5).5 
Although returning to incarceration after temporary leave is a daunting experience for many 
prisoners (Grupp, 1970; Toch, 1967), many view it as a positive option (Holt, 1971). Even so, 
one Norwegian study reported some prisoners feeling apprehensive and lonely while on 
                                                             
5 Prison affects people differently, and some men find that prison has encouraged them to re-evaluate and re-
establish family ties (McCarthy & Adams, 2019; blinded for peer review). Furthermore, in some countries 
availability of guarantors on the outside, such as family, is required for a temporary leave to be granted, thus 
potentially discriminating against foreign nationals and those without family support (Cheliotis, 2005; also Markley, 
1973; O’Donnell & Jewkes, 2011). 
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temporary leave, perhaps because they were not properly prepared and later debriefed (Toch, 
1967; see Shammas, 2014 on ‘the pains of freedom’). 
 
By facilitating, among other things, family and work-force (re)integration, temporary leave may 
be instrumental in crime reduction and victim compensation, thus creating a more harmonious 
society (Boulois v. Luxembourg, 2012; European Parliament, 1999). Nonetheless, the public, 
habitually mistrustful of offenders, rarely supports early or temporary release of prisoners, 
especially those convicted of sex offences (Cheliotis, 2005; Suhling & Rehder, 2009). The media 
and politicians capitalise on and fuel moral panic, public punitiveness, and sometimes genuine 
indignation (see O’Donnell & Jewkes, 2011; van Zyl Smit, 1988; Wright & Rosky, 2011; cf. 
Moran & Keinänen, 2012). In this climate, prison leave schemes tend to be underused and often 
benefit only prisoners perceived as being at low risk of violating the conditions of temporary 
leave, whereas these prisoners are not necessarily in the greatest need of this measure (Cheliotis, 
2005, 2014). Public and administrators’ concerns are not groundless. The ECtHR case law 
presents examples of prisoners committing crimes, including murders, whilst on temporary leave 
(Maiorano and Others v. Italy, 2009; Mastromatteo v. Italy, 2002; also Markley, 1973; 
O’Donnell & Jewkes, 2011). However, given that the administrators and judges authorising 
temporary leave seem to be (over) risk-averse, whilst prisoners are cognisant of severe 
consequences for violating the conditions of temporary leave, those granted temporary leave 
generally comply with its conditions (Holt, 1971; Shichor & Allen, 1978; Tadič, 2018; Turner & 
Petersilia, 1996; van Zyl Smit, 1988). For example, drawing on the study in a large men’s prison 
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in Greece, Cheliotis (2005) reports an average 6.06% failure to return to prison6 among almost a 
thousand prisoners released annually on a temporary leave in 2000-2001. Other studies also 
report a low level of breaches: less than 5% in Finland; 0.04% of failures to return in Spain; and 
2.1% and 4.7% of revocation of education-related and work-related temporary leave respectively 
in the Canadian province of Ontario (Fox, 1971; Larrauri, 2019; Moran & Keinänen, 2012).   
 
Despite its postulated importance in offender rehabilitation (‘correction’), in practice, and often 
in law, temporary leave usually constitutes an incentive that must be earned – with the attendant 
moral, behavioural, and managerial consequences (see Cheliotis, 2014; Larrauri, 2019). As with 
other incentive schemes, temporary leave may work as a soft coercive tool to control prisoners 
(Cheliotis, 2008; Moran & Keinänen, 2012). However, when a line between a right and a 
privilege blurs, whatever constitutes a privilege automatically elevates to a sought resource that 
breeds competition amongst prisoners, dilutes their solidarity, and instigates docile self-control 
that often results in the legitimacy deficit of the regime (Bottoms, 2002, 2003; Crewe, 2009; 
Mathiesen, 1965; Toch, 1967). It may also strain relationships between prisoners and the prison 
personnel dispensing incentives (Crewe, 2009; Larrauri, 2019; Liebling, 2004). Even so, research 
links the availability of temporary leave to less violence and better control in prison (Dünkel & 
van Zyl Smit, 2001; also see Suhling & Rehder, 2009).  
 
In sum, notwithstanding its coercive potential and some scepticism regarding its effect on 
decreasing or delaying reoffending, temporary leave is widely recognised as a positive measure. 
However, availability and conditions of temporary leave, its prevalence and forms vary greatly 
                                                             
6 Cheliotis (2005) found that the authorities normally overlooked short delays, attributing them to transportation 
problems. The threshold at considering non-return as a breach of licence seemed to be around 24-48 hours after the 
scheduled time. 
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across jurisdictions. The nature of offence may disqualify some prisoners, whilst others usually 
must serve a minimum tariff before qualifying or there is a maximum annual cap on the number 
of periods of leave (Larrauri, 2019; Moran & Keinänen, 2012; Shichor & Allen, 1978; Toch, 
1967; van Zyl Smit, 1988; cf. Fox, 1971). Temporary leave may be escorted or unescorted. It can 
be almost automatic or require assessment and authorisation by prison authorities and external 
agents. However, as most of the Anglophone research on temporary leave comes from the 
‘global North’, the question follows:  what is the state of temporary leave beyond the collective 
‘West’? In what follows, I explain who authorises temporary leave in Ukraine, the criteria for a 
prisoner to be allowed temporary leave, and how the law and practice interact in this post-Soviet 
country. Answers to these questions allow us to see the institution of temporary leave in a more 
global perspective. They also highlight the tension between, on the one hand, the salience of risk 
and blame evasion and, on the other hand, rehabilitative ambition.   
 
Temporary leave in Ukrainian law 
Ukrainian law designates criminal punishment as a means of retribution (кара in Ukrainian), 
individual and general deterrence, along with ‘correction’ (rehabilitation) and resocialisation of 
offenders (Criminal Code of Ukraine, 2001: Article 50).7 The official web-site of the Ukrainian 
Penitentiary Service (https://www.kvs.gov.ua)8 is imbued with rhetoric about the Service’s 
commitment to rehabilitation of offenders. The law stipulates that the execution of criminal 
punishments, including imprisonment, should rest on the principles of, inter alia, fairness, 
                                                             
7 See Canton & Padfield (2019) on moral rehabilitation, reconciliation, and a philosophy of responding to 
wrongdoing, Moran and Keinänen (2012) on the Finish case of criminal punishment as moral shaping, and van Zyl 
Smit (1988) on the relationship between prison leave and, inter alia, general deterrence. 
8 I use the title Ukrainian Penitentiary Service although this government agency responsible for execution of both 
custodial and non-custodial criminal punishments regularly undergoes reorganisation and name changes. Currently it 
constitutes a branch of the Ministry of Justice under the name State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine, the most 
common title since the prison system was formally separated from the Ministry of the Interior in 1998. 
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humanism, respect for human rights and liberties, differentiation and personalisation (i.e. a fit-
for-person approach), and on a balance between coercion and encouragement, punishment and 
correction (Criminal-Executive Code of Ukraine [CECU], 2003: Article 1). Ukrainian law 
presents temporary leave as a reward for prisoners’ good behaviour, a means of ‘correction’9 and 
as preparation for ultimate release. It is also intended as an expression of the state’s alleged 
humanity. However, even in theory, temporary leave is available to a very limited segment of 
Ukrainian prisoners. 
 
Whereas most prisoners (except lifers) have, at least legally, the chance of early conditional 
release,10 the law provides for short-term leave on compassionate grounds only for those in 
‘open’ prisons (so-called ‘correctional centres’), juvenile prisons, minimum-security prisons with 
relaxed regimes, the pre-release sections of minimum-security prisons with general conditions 
and the pre-release sections of medium-security prisons (CECU, 2003: Article 111). Although 
the Council of Europe (1982) recommends expansion of prison leave, Ukrainian law emphasises 
that reasons for temporary leave of up to ten days, including up to three days for commuting, 
must be exceptional. These reasons include: the death or life-threatening illness of a close 
relative; a natural disaster that has caused considerable material loss to the offender or their 
family; and medical treatment if unavailable in a prison facility and when authorised by a prison 
doctor (Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2011). Additionally, women prisoners whose children are 
in prison kindergartens (if born in prison, a child can stay with their mother up to the age of 
                                                             
9 Prison law and policies are replete with the phrase ‘prisoners who have entered the path of correction’ (in the 
Soviet-era Corrective-Labour Code the phrase was ‘a solid path of correction’ (CLCUkrSSR, 1970; Supreme Court 
of Ukraine, 1997). 
10 The CPT constantly calls on the Ukrainian authorities to humanise the regime for prisoners serving life sentences 
and guarantee them realistic prospects for conditional release (parole) (CPT, 2018: Para 81).   
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three) can request ten-days’ leave, plus three extra days for commuting, to put a child with their 
relatives, guardians or into an orphanage (CECU, 2003: Article 111).   
 
Prisoners in ‘open’ prisons (‘correctional centres’) can also apply for temporary leave to sit 
exams, attend investigative procedures or court proceedings if required, for the birth of a child, to 
apply for a state pension,11 as well as to arrange housing and work before release. The policy is 
unclear about the duration of leave in these circumstances. Although policy allows for court or 
investigation-related leave to last for the duration of the proceedings, arranging housing or 
employment can warrant up to seven days (Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2011: Article 3). As a 
reward for good behaviour and diligent work, the administration of ‘open’ prisons can authorise 
once-a-month leave for a weekend or national holiday (CECU, 2003: Article 67:1).  
 
As a reward for good behaviour and diligent study, juvenile prisoners may leave prison during 
the day for up to 8 hours (returning before 8pm), if accompanied by prison staff, parents 
(guardians) or close relatives. This can be to attend cultural, sport, or entertainment activities or 
in lieu of a short visit (CECU, 2003: Articles 144; Prison Bylaws, 2018). Juvenile prisoners and 
accompanying adults must sign a declaration acknowledging that they have been told the 
conditions of day leave and the consequences in case of any breaches. During such leave, 
juvenile prisoners are prohibited from smoking, consuming alcohol or illicit substances, leaving 
the designated area (town), being unsupervised, or bringing contraband into prison upon return. 
As with other instances of temporary leave, prisoners are strip searched on leaving and re-
entering prisons (Prison Bylaws, 2018: Rule XVI: 1; 3; see Fox, 1971). 
                                                             
11 Prisoners can apply for a national identification card, arrange pension, and conduct other legal deeds from the 
prison. 
12 
 
Since 2012, apart from these humanitarian reasons, Ukraine theoretically allows 14-days’ annual 
leave for prisoners in minimum-security establishments with relaxed regime. There is a caveat 
emphasising that only those working in prison qualify. Additionally, as a reward for complying 
with Prison Bylaws and health and safety industrial production requirements, prisoners in pre-
release sectors of medium-security prisons can be granted up to seven days’ leave (CECU, 2003: 
Article 130). As prison labour in Ukraine serves as a semi-official proxy for ‘correction’ (see 
(Symkovych, 2018a), this provision squarely makes temporary leave an incentive. Ukraine 
employs an incremental system of punishment meaning that restrictions can be relaxed and 
privileges granted, including temporary leave, provided a prisoner demonstrates good behaviour 
and diligence in work or education (CECU, 2003: Article 100). However, as we know, law-in-
action differs from law-on-the-books. Availability of resources, legacies of policies and 
practices, institutional cultures and inter-agency synergy, or competition or a lack of 
understanding of the frontline realities by policy-developers, all affect how laws and polices 
work on the ground. In addition, policy complexity, as well as number and training of 
practitioners, their understanding,  support or, conversely, moral rejection of the law and 
policies12 mediate how written law translates into practice (Canton, 2006; Nelken, 2010). Next, I 
explain the decision-making in the administration of temporary leave, followed by statistics that 
show how legal provisions (do not) translate into practice. 
 
Decision-making 
In some jurisdictions temporary leave becomes automatic once certain criteria are satisfied. 
However, in most penal systems it entails discretionary decisions that manage clashing interests, 
                                                             
12 See Symkovych (2018a) on prison officers’ views of the legitimacy of penal policies and practices, as well as of 
their own authority. 
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concerns, and rights. Most notably, decision-makers must find a balance between threats to 
public safety or the caprices of public opinion and the merits of progressive social reintegration 
through temporary leave, also taking into account any humanitarian aspects (O’Donnell & 
Jewkes, 2011; van Zyl Smit, 1988). 
 
Ukrainian law invests prison commanders (or those temporarily in charge) with the power to 
decide individual applications for temporary prison leave. A decision regarding temporary leave 
should take into account the personality and behaviour of a prisoner, although neither the law, 
nor the Ministry of Justice’s policy specify exactly what may disqualify a prisoner (CECU, 2003; 
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2011). The decision should be taken within 24 hours of receiving 
the application and supporting documents such as a death certificate or a local authority’s letter 
confirming a natural disaster. This blanket urgency suggests that temporary leave is envisioned 
as an extraordinary emergency rather than a sentence plan. The leave duration should take 
account of the basis of the request and the distances involved. When refused, the authorities must 
list the grounds for refusal (Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2011: Article 10). If granted, a prison 
commander must personally [emphasis added] brief the prisoner about the conduct required and 
warn them about their criminal responsibility regarding late return or absconding. A prisoner 
must sign an acknowledgement that becomes a part of their file. Conditions during temporary 
leave include prohibition of consuming illegal drugs or alcohol and leaving the authorised 
location (Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2011: Article 16).  
 
The prison authorities then issue prisoners with a temporary identity card/letter and their civilian 
clothes. Transport to the destination become a prisoner’s or their family’s responsibility. A 
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prisoner under the age of 16 must be accompanied by relatives or, if authorised by a prison 
commander, guardians, although the circle of eligible relatives is not specified (Ministry of 
Justice of Ukraine, 2011: Article 15). If prisoners do not have enough money to return, the prison 
provides this but the policy mentions neither the method nor the consequences of such a situation 
(Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2011: Article 23). The prisoner must register with the local 
probation service upon arrival and before departure, as well as give reasons (and later 
substantiate them) for any inability to return on time, including admission to hospital. The chief-
officer-on-duty (ChPNK) has to inform the UkrPS regional office about each temporary leave 
(and return) (see Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2011: Article 26). That prisons must report each 
case of temporary leave to one of the six regional centres and that prison commanders are 
required to personally brief prisoners before temporary leave points to high sensitivity of the 
institution of temporary leave in Ukraine and its extraordinary nature. Next, I argue that numbers 
also show that temporary leave is being rarely, if ever, granted even to the small circle of 
prisoners who legally qualify. 
 
National statistics  
In the wake of the 2014 political crisis, the Ukrainian Penitentiary Service (UkrPS) stopped 
updating its website while the Service was undergoing another reorganisation. Although the 
website resumed its work in 2018, most of the previously available statistics are no longer 
accessible. I filed several freedom-of-information (FOI) inquiries concerning the number of 
applications for temporary leave and those approved, along with other relevant information, such 
as licence breaches or appeals refusal. However, the Penitentiary Service failed to supply these 
statistics despite repeated requests in 2018-2019 and complaints to the Ministry of Justice, under 
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which the UkrPS operates. In lieu of response, the UkrPS sent me long excerpts of the law 
regulating FOI and extracts of the policies regulating temporary leave – despite them being 
publicly accessible and me quoting them in my FOI inquiries. Finally, in April 2019 the UkrPS 
claimed that it does not have information about temporary leave in Ukraine, suggesting 
individual prisons might have it.  
 
I followed the UkrPS suggestion and requested the numbers in question from all six prison 
regions, given that according to the policy, the chief-officer-on-duty (ChPNK) in individual 
prisons must report to the relevant regional centre each case of temporary leave. Whilst two of 
the regions responded with some of the requested data, the other three initially claimed that my 
FOI requests were not filed in the correct format. Although this was not the case, I refiled them 
and eventually also had to send reminders, electronically and by registered mail, as the regions 
missed (some by months) all legal deadlines. Tellingly, the central region claimed that the 
requested data concerning temporary leave were for internal use only, thus refusing to release 
this ‘classified’ information. Even so, the data obtained from the two regions suggest that 
temporary leave remains an exceptional measure available to a limited number of prisoners: 
mostly to those in ‘open’ prisons and sometimes for those living in minimum-security closed 
prisons. 
 
The South-Eastern management region (10 closed prisons) responded that in 2017-2019 no 
prisoners in its closed prisons requested temporary leave on exceptional (compassionate) 
grounds, nor was any granted as a reward. This was despite 4.7% prisoners living in pre-release 
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sectors thus qualifying for temporary leave.13 However, in 2018-2019 two juvenile prisoners 
were allowed to attend events outside their prisons under staff supervision. The North-Eastern 
region (10 closed prisons), however, reported 144 cases of temporary leave in its closed prisons 
in 2018, including 127 cases of those lasting 14 days, i.e. granted to prisoners in minimum-
security establishments with relaxed regime.14One prisoner did not return due to their death and 
9 returned late due to extended medical treatment. This suggests that strict selection and potential 
sanctions result in minimal breaches of licence condition.  
 
One study reported national statistics of temporary leave in Ukraine, citing the UkrPS website as 
a source.15 According to this PhD thesis from the Academy of the Internal Affairs of Ukraine, in 
2011, 232 prisoners, or 0.2% of all prisoners, were allowed temporary leave. This extremely low 
number persisted for the following years (245 in 2012; 207 in 2013) until, in 2014, dropping to 
36 prisoners, i.e. 0.04% of the prison population (Kruk, 2015). In comparison, in Spain, with a 
similar size of prisoner population, more than 150,000 prisoners were granted temporary leave in 
2016 (Larrauri, 2019).16 The two out of six regions, by definition, cannot be representative. 
However, the apparent reluctance to supply data and the available numbers suggest that prison 
                                                             
13 In October 2019 there were 159 qualifying male prisoners in pre-release centres of medium security prisons 
(housing 6,712 male prisoners in total), 14 male and 21 female prisoners in pre-release centres of minimum security 
prisons (housing 347 male and 399 female prisoners in total), and 4 female prisoners housed in a minimum-security 
prison with relaxed conditions. Unlike in closed prisons, in ‘open’ prisons 398 prisoners received 497 temporary 
leave authorisations in 2018. The most common grounds were medical reasons (58.1%), attending court and 
investigation proceedings (32.4%), arranging post-release housing and employment (5.2%), or for some other 
purposes (4.2%). In addition, as an incentive 31 prisoners in ‘open’ prisons (housing 432 prisoners) received 50 
authorisations of temporary leave to visit close relatives. 
14 In ‘open’ prisons, there were 453 authorisations of temporary leave, mostly for medical purposes (56.7%), 
attending court proceedings (15%), arranging post-release accommodation (5%) or because of ‘other important 
circumstances’ (11.4%). Additionally, 101 authorisations were granted as a reward for good behaviour. One prisoner 
from an ‘open’ prison did not return from temporary leave and was prosecuted. 
15 Although I have been monitoring the UkrPS website for the last decade, I have not seen this statistic. I could not 
reach the author of that PhD thesis to clarify the source of these data. 
16 For comparison, In Finland, where the prison population is much smaller (3,526) and penal policies and practices 
are more liberal, 11,312 instances of temporary leave, an average of three per prisoner, were authorised in 2008 
(Moran & Keinänen, 2012). 
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leave is an extraordinary measure in Ukraine to which the vast majority of prisoners have no 
recourse, neither on humanitarian grounds, or as a part of a sentence plan. 
 
Discussion 
That so many former prisoners around the world reoffend points to the problems of both in-
prison intervention and post-prison (re)integration into society-at-large (Alahdadi, 2016; 
Cheliotis, 2008, 2009; Cullen, Jonson, & Nagin, 2011; Gaum, Hoffman, & Venter, 2006; Wright 
& Rosky, 2011). Temporary leave intends to address these two areas by bridging them. It 
reduces the negative effects of incarceration, including the classical ‘pains of imprisonment’ 
(Sykes, 1958), prepares prisoners for post-prison civilian life, and in some cases for repayment 
of dues to victims and wider community (Fox, 1971; Grupp, 1970; Shichor & Allen, 1978; van 
Zyl Smit, 1988).  
 
As I have demonstrated, Ukraine, at least in theory, recognises the value of temporary leave by 
institutionalising it in its national law. However, although provision for prison leave has been 
legislated for decades (see Supreme Court of Ukraine, 1997), its actual use seems low. First, by 
restricting the use of temporary leave to mostly ‘open’ prisons, juvenile prisons, and pre-release 
sectors of minimum-security prisons with general conditions and medium-security prison, the 
law effectively denies temporary leave to most prisoners. This means that of 55,900 prisoners, 
only 1,643 men and 1,532 women in minimum-security prisons, 1,092 men and 102 women in 
pre-release sections of medium-security prisons, 1,569 prisoners in ‘open’ prisons, and 136 
juvenile prisoners can, at least in theory, apply for temporary leave. In other words, Ukraine a 
priori denies 85% of sentenced prisoners and 90% of all prisoners the possibility of temporary 
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leave, even on compassionate grounds, regardless of the actual risk they may pose or the date of 
their release.  
 
Although the Council of Europe recommends making temporary leave an integral part of a 
custodial sentence (Council of Europe, 1982; European Prison Rules, 2006: Rule 103.6), the 
position in Ukraine suggests that temporary leave constitutes a legal privilege available to a tiny 
fraction of prisoners. This effectively excludes the majority of Ukrainian prisoners, even if only 
months or days before their release, because most of them are held in medium-security prisons 
and rarely get transferred to a lower security category or pre-release sectors even when these are 
available (see [removed for blind review]).  
 
Ukraine also denies temporary leave to prisoners serving short custodial sentences (below six 
months) in detention houses as well as those held in prison hospitals. This really defies the 
objectives of temporary leave such as release-preparation or seeking medical treatment 
unavailable inside prisons, as well as precluding attendance at funerals or childbirth even when 
prisoners are at the end of their custodial sentences (see Płoski v. Poland, 2003; European Prison 
Rules, 2006: Rules 24.5; 24.7; 40.3; 40.5; 103.6). Thus, whilst in some jurisdictions temporary 
leave implies a progression towards an open custodial regime, or a test for parole, in Ukraine 
rather than being a right it constitutes a rare privilege available only to a small minority of 
prisoners housed in juvenile prisons and semi-open conditions. 
 
Second, the year-long quest to get official statistics and the failure of the UkrPS to supply all the 
data requested, including regional data, suggests that temporary leave is a sensitive issue in 
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Ukraine. However, even those national numbers available underscore that Ukraine rarely grants 
temporary leave to its still significant prison population: 242 instances of temporary leave, the 
highest known number for the entire country, from more than 6,000 prisoners who are legally 
qualified by virtue of not being in remand prisons, maximum-security prisons, or the main 
sectors of medium-security prisons. 
 
Third, although the UkrPS issues policies to clarify all major legal provisions and explain their 
implementation, its policy on prison leave was issued eight years after the main law regulating 
execution of punishment was enacted.17 Even so, whereas other prison policies are replete with 
details, such as how to address officials or where to hold hands during movement around the 
prison (e.g. Prison Bylaws, 2018), the policy on temporary leave reveals major grey areas and 
exceptional vagueness. For example, it does not mention the rights of victims nor the appeals 
procedure – despite the constitutional right of all citizens to appeal any decision or authorities’ 
inaction. The policy fails to clarify which relatives and in what number must accompany a 
juvenile prisoner during temporary leave. Whereas the policy allows leave to men in ‘open’ 
prisons in the event of the birth of a child, it requires a birth certificate as a proof. This means a 
prisoner cannot be present during the delivery, and most likely in the first days after birth. 
Cumulatively this suggests that temporary prison leave for prisoners in closed prisons has not yet 
been institutionalised and exists mostly on paper. 
  
Fourth, the policy clearly links temporary leave to prisoners’ conduct. To qualify, prisoners have, 
inter alia, to prove their ‘correction’ by demonstrating exemplary performance at school or in 
                                                             
17 The old law, Corrective-Labour Code (1970: Article 92), mentioned temporary leave for exiled prisoners (i.e. they 
could re-enter the territory from which they were banished). The replacement Criminal-Executive Code of Ukraine 
(2003) applied most of those regulations concerning temporary leave of exiled prisoners to prisoners held in prisons. 
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prison industry. In other words, temporary leave in Ukraine is a privilege to be earned and never 
a right. Even in the case of prisoners seeking external medical diagnosis or treatment, the prison 
doctor must pre-authorise it. However, as the CPT (2018) regularly highlights, although de jure 
independent, prison medical personnel often seem to collude with the prison authorities, thus 
potentially leaving such decisions to the discretion of prison commanders.  
   
Conclusion 
The law cannot be sequestered from its implementation. I have demonstrated that despite 
Ukraine’s claims of ‘Europeanisation’ and its legal and rhetorical commitment to rehabilitation 
and resocialisation of prisoners, the penal system remains over-repressive and rigid. My analysis 
shows that temporary prison leave in Ukraine remains mostly unused, despite having been 
legislated for some time. It constitutes a legal privilege available to a miniscule segment of 
prisoners, excluding those in the deep end who may be in the greatest need of it. Temporary 
leave in Ukraine seems to be an extraordinary emergency, as well as a reward for good 
behaviour, rather than a constituent of sentence aimed at preparing prisoners for civilian life.  
 
Given the international evidence of the value of temporary leave in preserving prisoners’ 
humanity, (re)integrating offenders in the community, and ultimately creating more harmonious 
society, I argue for reversing the logic concerning temporary leave by specifying circumstances 
in which prisoners could be denied temporary leave. This also entails abandoning blanket 
prohibitions, e.g. to all prisoners in detention houses, maximum-security prisons or main sections 
of medium-security prisons – in other words: to the vast majority of Ukrainian prisoners. As a 
party to the ECtHR, Ukraine should respect the court’s ruling designating temporary leave as 
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contextual and thus potentially a civil right even if the national law frames it as a privilege. 
Notwithstanding the elevated risks that many prisoners housed there pose, the mechanic risk 
categorisation in Ukraine, as well as the diversity of the population and situations that may 
necessitate temporary leave should be recognised and the possibility of temporary leave, perhaps 
under escort (currently absent), should not be denied a priori. Practically, by making temporary 
leave more available, Ukraine can help its understaffed prisons maintain control and decrease 
reliance on the underworld prisoner organisation (see Symkovych, 2018b, 2018a, 2018d, 2018e) 
on the effect that early release and other liberalisation measures have had on power relations in a 
Ukrainian prison; also Cheliotis, 2008). However, the clear criteria of the factors that may result 
in denial of temporary must be set and explained to prisoners and relatives as the vague policy on 
temporary leave may contribute to the already problematic situation with legitimacy in Ukraine 
(see Larrauri, 2019; Symkovych, 2018a; Toch, 1967). 
 
To fully understand the local penal philosophy and policies we have to study how they work in 
practice, what those directly affected make of them – offenders and victims, but also prison and 
probation staff, as well as the public, media, and politicians. Given the evident limitations of this 
article, much will be gained from more focused research on the decision-making of 
powerholders, as well as prisoners. More specifically, what are the major concerns and 
considerations of those who have discretion in the authorisation of temporary leave? How do 
prisoners, victims, and the wider public view temporary leave? Empirical, moral, and theoretical 
questions abound about the role of the penal culture, public sentiments, personal punitiveness, 
relationships with superiors, and perhaps even sex of an applicant (e.g. potential pregnancy) in 
such decision-making. Once temporary leave ceases to be an exception in Ukraine, its roles in 
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prisoner rehabilitation, social restoration, and in the control and maintenance of prison order 
would require exploration, as well as merits of decisions and appeals where prisoners are denied 
temporary leave.18 
 
Ukraine is a country of substantial public mistrust in the criminal justice system, whose 
shortcomings are abundant (Symkovych, 2018a, 2018c). Despite relatively low victimisation, 
Ukrainians report considerable levels of fear of crime and rank security concerns as high (Bova, 
2012). Surveys reveal significant levels of punitiveness among Ukrainians, for example, 
supporting the death penalty (GESIS, 2013). Thus, if the government were to really embrace 
temporary leave, some public outcry would follow, not least because breaches of temporary 
leave conditions are inevitable. There seems to be no shortage of politicians and media who are 
eager to capitalise on people’s insecurities and punitiveness (also O’Donnell & Jewkes, 2011; 
van Zyl Smit, 1988). Educating politicians, street-level bureaucrats, and the public is important 
(European Parliament, 1999; Fox, 1971; Grupp, 1970), especially in a country where the saying 
‘a thief belongs in prison’ elevates to a fundamentalist orthodoxy that neglects the complexity of 
human nature or the possibility of offender redemption. However, despite popular calls to 
reinstate the death penalty, expand life imprisonment (which in Ukraine already effectively 
means life in prison), and harden punishment, the state continues gradual, sometimes erratic, 
liberalisation as a part of its ’Europeanisation’. The public seems relatively oblivious or 
indifferent to major changes in penal policies or judicial and prison practices.19 Perhaps not 
                                                             
18 The two regions that supplied statistics mentioned only one prisoner’s appeal that was nonetheless rejected 
because the prisoner submitted incorrect documentation to justify the request for temporary leave to sit exams. 
19 The only exception is perhaps the so-called Savchenko law passed in December 2015. According to this law, 
imprisonment on remand counted as double time. As a result, 8,500 prisoners who spent a long time on remand 
during investigation and trial were released before their original date. This law triggered indignation and criticism 
from some segments of society, as well as the prison, police and investigative services, for ‘setting dangerous 
criminals free’, ‘instigating criminality’, and ‘endangering’ society. The parliament repealed this law in May 2017. 
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surprisingly, in a country at war with a plethora of pressing concerns, where many people 
struggle to just live ‘normal’ lives, the public and the media seem to be mostly unaware of the 
recent threefold decrease in Ukraine’s prison population. Thus, rolling out the temporary leave 
scheme concurrently with substantive measures to educate the public on its benefits may not 
prove too politically costly. However, and with due respect to the vibrant Ukrainian civil society, 
in my view, the initiative and, more importantly, pressure to expand temporary prison leave is 
likely to come from outside.  
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